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Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies
in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the rise of right-wing populism.
Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements
has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective
action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to
concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is
demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether
relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in
pro-majority collective action, and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective
action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected
that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported
the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of
intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a
stronger predictor in case of the Roma minority group. In a second study (N = 320)
we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected
both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect
on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension. Nevertheless, it influenced
pro-minority collective action intentions especially in the presence of high empathy and
low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were
higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The
effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These
findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action
intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.
Keywords: citizenship, ethnic, civic, collective action, Roma, immigrants
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INTRODUCTION
The way in which high status, privileged, ethnic majority
members of society act toward minorities has a huge impact
on the situation of disadvantaged groups, and on society as
a whole. In recent years we witnessed a rise in volunteerism
and various forms of pro-social behavior toward members
of disadvantaged minority groups, such as refugees (see e.g.,
Hamann and Karakayali, 2016). At the same time, there has also
been a rise in intolerance (Pew Research, 2016), open hostility
and hate crimes (Williamson, 2016; Pew Research, 2017), and
protests of nationalist white supremacy groups both in Europe
and in the United States (Muis and Immerzeel, 2017). These
changes can be explained by the increasing acceptability of these
attitudes and behaviors (Crandall et al., 2018). The aim of the
current study is to understand how different definitions of the
nation can predict and influence intergroup behavioral intentions
of majority group members toward minorities, specifically
with regard to the Roma ethnic minority group and Muslim
immigrants in Hungary. We consider this issue particularly
important in the current social and political context of Europe
where Roma people are treated as second rate citizens, and
terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists have almost all been
committed by second or third generation immigrants, pointing
to substantial problems with the social inclusion of immigrants
in the national ingroup.
Definitions of the Nation
The nation can be defined as an imagined community (Anderson,
1983) with shared history, culture, and laws (Smith, 1991).
There are two chief mechanisms that describe the conditions
of membership in the national ingroup, generally referred to as
ethnic vs. civic definitions of citizenship (Kohn, 1944; Brubaker,
1996). Although the actual content of civic vs. ethnic definitions
varies historically and across countries, there is ample empirical
evidence for the continuing validity of this distinction despite the
fact that the legal systems of all countries include both definitions
to some extent. This evidence suggests that an ethnic definition
of citizenship considers ancestry as the most important criterion
of inclusion (i.e., jus sanguinis or the right of blood). An ethnic
definition also entails that members of the nation have a common
cultural heritage, language, and religion, and the group can
be identified unambiguously (Smith, 1991). In contrast, a civic
definition entails that citizenship can be gained by efforts to join
the group and adherence to legal norms (Reeskens and Hooghe,
2010). The civic definition of citizenship can be exemplified by
the concept of French nationhood that is strongly connected to
the ideals of the French revolution resulting in France becoming
a melting pot of nations with a disregard of ethnicity (see
Berdah, 2006). It does not follow that legal requirements are not
important for ethnic citizenship, it simply indicates that legal
compliance and efforts are not sufficient. This expectation of
legal adherence within both citizenship concepts implies that
the two approaches are not entirely antagonistic, and tend to
correlate positively rather than negatively (see Pehrson et al.,
2009b; Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). Endorsement of either of
the two definitions of citizenship can be grasped on an individual
level and on macro or cultural levels. Members of ethnically and
culturally relatively homogenous countries are more likely to rely
on ethnic definitions than civic ones (Reeskens and Hooghe,
2010).
These two approaches to citizenship have entirely different
consequences for immigrants and members of ethnic minority
groups. The concept of ethnic citizenship denies acceptance into
the national ingroup for people who are ethnically different, while
civic citizenship permits the acceptance of those who comply to
the legal requirements of being or becoming a citizen. Therefore,
a predominantly ethnic definition of citizenship can lead to
higher hostility toward non-ethnic immigrants (Pehrson et al.,
2009b; Reijerse et al., 2012; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2015;
Mepham and Verkuyten, 2017), and within the framework of
ethnic citizenship the connection between national identity and
prejudice against non-members is stronger (see Örkény, 2005;
Pehrson et al., 2009a). Politicians often rely on this connection
and use the concept of ethnic citizenship or some variation
of it to promote anti-immigrant policies. This has been the
case with most European right-wing populist parties that built
their support by presenting immigrants as an ethnic threat
(see Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012), but perhaps a better-known
example is the anti-immigrant rhetoric used by Trump’s 2016
presidential campaign focusing on American national identity
(see Knowles and Tropp, 2018).
However, some minority groups are closer to the ingroup
than others because of a shared history or smaller perceived
cultural distance. Therefore, traditional ethnic minority groups
with a shared history may be perceived as less distant than
ethnically different, new immigrant groups (Parker, 2010). This
is important because perceived intergroup distance can have
consequences for moral obligations toward members of the
outgroup (Coryn and Borshuk, 2006; Hadarics and Kende, 2018),
and high perceived distance limits their potential inclusion.
Thus, both the definition of citizenship and perceived intergroup
distance can influence whether ethnic majority citizens consider
members of immigrant and ethnic minority groups as potential
citizens.
Besides different definitions of citizenship and consequently
who is included in or excluded from the national ingroup, we can
also distinguish between different modes of identification with
the nation. Roccas et al. (2006) used the terms attachment and
glorification to label two distinct psychological mechanisms of
group identification. People feel attachment with their ingroup
if the group merely represents a source of positive self-esteem
in line with the original claims of the social identity theory
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Glorification, on the other hand, means
that members consider their group superior to other groups
resulting in uncritical loyalty to the group by its members. These
two modes of identification are manifested in different forms
of national identity and reflected in the distinctions between
patriotism and nationalism (see Li and Brewer, 2004; Wagner
et al., 2012; Heinrich, 2016), genuine patriotism and pseudo-
patriotism (Adorno et al., 1950), and blind and constructive
patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999). These terms all reveal a
distinction between one’s positive emotional tie to the nation and
the uncritical belief in its superiority.
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Predictably, these two modes of identification with the nation
have different consequences for attitudes toward integration
of minorities and toward immigration in general (for an
overview see Huddy, 2016). There is ample empirical evidence
that blind/pseudo-patriotism or nationalism is associated with
higher xenophobia (Spry and Hornsey, 2007), and lead to the
escalation of intergroup conflicts through increased cognitive
bias, stereotyping, moral disengagement (Leidner et al., 2010;
Dugas et al., 2017), and sensitivity to threat and provocation
(Sahar, 2008; Leidner and Castano, 2012; Steele et al., 2015;
Rovenpor et al., 2016). Research has also shown that nationalism
is more systematically associated with outgroup derogation than
national attachment or constructive patriotism (for a review see
Golec de Zavala et al., 2017).
Evidence for the connection between nationalism and
intergroup hostility is straightforward. However, it has been
more difficult to demonstrate that attachment with the ingroup
or constructive patriotism is associated with positive rather
than negative attitudes toward immigrants and ethnic minorities
(Parker, 2010). The difficulty of establishing the connection
between genuine patriotism and positive outgroup attitudes has
at least three key reasons. Firstly, it has to do with the basic
assumptions of social identity theory that suggests an inherent
need for positively differentiating the ingroup even at the cost of
discriminating against the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
Secondly, it can be explained by the association between all
forms of positive attitudes toward the national ingroup and right-
wing or conservative political ideologies (see e.g., Duckitt and
Sibley, 2016; with the exception of constructive patriotism, the
operationalization of which includes the endorsement of social
change efforts and shows no association with political ideology or
political party identification, see Schatz et al., 1999). And thirdly,
this difficulty may be explained by different outcomes of genuine
patriotism toward different types of outgroups. According to
Parker’s (2010) study, blind patriotism of US respondents
predicted hostility toward a number of outgroups, such as
African Americans, Jews, and Arabs, but symbolic patriotism
promoted positive rather than negative attitudes mostly toward
“domestic out-groups.” Thus, the positive association was much
weaker for Arab people than for African Americans or Jews.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that positive identification with
the nation can increase positive attitudes toward immigration by,
for example, emphasizing its inclusive character (Minescu et al.,
2008; Wagner et al., 2012). In summary, nationalism is associated
with the derogation of outgroups, such as immigrants and ethnic
minorities, while at least some forms of patriotism can function
as a protection from these forms of hostilities.
Blind patriotism or nationalism does not simply reflect a
mode of identification, it also implies an essentialist view of the
ingroup (Leyens et al., 2003). Therefore, ethnic citizenship is
closely associated with nationalism, having similar consequences
in terms of attitudes toward non-ethnic immigrants and ethnic
minority groups. Schmidt et al. (2016) showed that higher
endorsement of the ethnic definition of citizenship predicted
higher level of exclusion from rights of non-ethnic migrants in
Germany while this connection was not found with the civic
definition. Sides and Citrin (2007) found that insistence on
cultural unity (i.e., belief in a culturally homogenous concept
of the nation) was the most robust predictor of anti-immigrant
attitudes in the 15 EU member states of that time and in Hungary,
the Czechia, and Poland based on the 2002–2003 European
Social Survey data. Mepham and Verkuyten (2017) found that
civic as opposed to ethnic concepts of citizenship predicted
greater support for immigrant rights, and this relationship was
mediated by perceived indispensability of immigrant groups for
the ingroup. These results suggest that personal endorsement of
ethnic citizenship and nationalism both have similarly negative
consequences for intergroup attitudes, and personal endorsement
of civic citizenship and genuine patriotism both have similarly
positive consequences.
Intergroup attitudes of advantaged, majority group members
toward minority groups are undeniably important and central
elements of intergroup relations. Openly hostile attitudes can
lead to discrimination or the rejection of ally activism (Çakal
et al., 2016), and more subtle forms of prejudice can create
obstacles to recognizing intergroup injustices (Powell et al., 2005;
Becker and Wright, 2011; Case et al., 2014). However, general
attitudes such as prejudice are not very accurate predictors of
actual behavior. For this reason, we analyzed the influence of
different definitions of citizenship on behavioral intentions that
are better predictors of behavior than attitudes (in line with
the theory of reasoned action by Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980, and
the theory of planned behavior by Ajzen, 1991) by measuring
pro-minority and pro-majority collective action intentions rather
than intergroup attitudes. While there is a well-known gap
between behavior intentions and actual behavior that should be
taken into considerations (Sheeran’s, 2002 review revealed that
intention strength can predict 28% of the variance of actual
behavior), expressing intentions to engage in certain type of
intergroup behavior can also influence social norms of behavior.
These norms are in turn a strong predictor of actual behavior
(see Cialdini et al., 1990; Nolan et al., 2008). Therefore, the point
of studying behavior intentions is not simply related to the fact
that these intentions may be realized as actions, but also to the
fact that they can serve as descriptive norms of behavior for
others. Research on collective action clearly suggests that actual
participation is strongly influenced by the perceived behavior
intention of others (e.g., Bolsen et al., 2014). This fits into our
interest in social movements, such as the politically antagonistic
pro-minority movements and right-wing nationalist movements
that shape intergroup relations in Europe.
Motivations for Pro-majority and
Pro-minority Collective Action
People engage in collective action to escape a negative social
identity by improving the intergroup situation for the benefit
of their group (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Wright et al., 1990),
especially if the group suffers from unjust disadvantages (van
Zomeren et al., 2011). Consequently, collective action signals the
social change efforts to eliminate threats to the positive identity
of the ingroup. It can be considered a form of social competition
that members of groups engage in against those individuals,
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groups, or authorities whom they identify as responsible for the
unjust intergroup situation (Simon and Klandermans, 2001).
Collective action research has been primarily concerned with
and informed by progressive movements of minority groups and
civil right movements. For this reason, pro-majority collective
action (i.e., populist radical right movements, white supremacy
movements, or extreme right-wing movements) have fallen
outside the scope of social psychological research on collective
action. However, both structurally disadvantaged and advantaged
members of society can experience that their group was treated
unfairly, in an unjust way, or it is affected by relative deprivation
(see Runciman, 1966). Consequently, members of the majority
can also develop intentions to engage in collective action based
on similar psychological motivations to improve the situation of
their ingroup regardless of their otherwise advantaged position in
society (Leach et al., 2007).
In fact, white supremacy or populist majority movements may
not be that different from for example civil rights movements
when they demand equal rights for white people, the restoration
of perceived injustices, and refer to disadvantages suffered by
the majority group (Blee and Creasap, 2010). Nevertheless, this
form of collective action was mostly examined within research
on right-wing extremism focusing on the individual psychology
of followers (in line with Adorno et al., 1950; see e.g., Simi
et al., 2017), and explained by right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA, Altemeyer, 1988), the role of psychological distress
and experience of threat (e.g., Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009),
and bias in social cognition, such as processing of fake news
and information on conspiracies (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).
While these approaches provide valuable insights into individual
differences in the appeal of nationalist, pro-majority movements,
they overlook group processes that may be more similar in
both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Putting together the
argument of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and
the special characteristics of followers of right-wing extremist
movements, we can conclude that nationalist, pro-majority social
movements emerge as a result of perceived injustices and relative
deprivation experienced by those members of the majority group
who are especially sensitive to identity threats by for example the
presence and influence of minority groups and immigration.
The interconnectedness of nationalism, perceived threat, and
intergroup hostility has been shown by research conducted
following terrorist attacks (e.g., Slone, 2000; Coryn et al., 2004),
and in more stable situations as well. Perceived threat to the
nation was found to increase xenophobic attitudes especially
among people who already identified strongly with the nation
(Sniderman et al., 2004). However, this is not a one-way
process, threat does not only increase hostility toward outgroups,
but it also strengthens national identification and therefore
contributes to the vicious circle of conflict escalation (see Blank
and Schmidt, 2003). This circular connection suggests that
nationalism may increase threat perceptions related to outgroups,
and at the same time the connection between nationalism
and intergroup hostility may be increased in the presence of
threat. These different processes highlight that while it may
be more meaningful to conceptualize the role of threat as a
mediator in the process, it can also be considered a moderator.
In summary, members of the majority ethnic group may show
higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action if
they feel that their national identity is threatened by outgroups (in
line with Mudde, 2004; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2010). Furthermore,
perceived threat related to ethnic minorities or non-ethnic
immigrants may be especially high among people who endorse
the more essentialized and fixed ethnic rather than the more
flexible civic definition of citizenship.
Intergroup hostility and nationalist movements against
minorities are only one side of the coin though, and do not grasp
the political and social context of contemporary intergroup issues
in its entirety. The same situations that evoke fear among some
people, evoke empathy in others. For example, following the 9/11
terrorist attacks, some members of the majority white population
in the United States pleaded for racial tolerance and condemned
the vicarious retaliation against Muslim people and immigrants
(Reed and Aquino, 2003). When people feel empathy with victims
of injustice, they recognize their suffering and feel motivated to
engage in collective action as if they experienced injustices on
behalf of their own ingroup (Thomas et al., 2009; Saab et al.,
2015). Majority group members can feel empathy and become
aware of social injustices suffered by members of an out-group
as a result of intergroup contact (Selvanathan et al., 2017) or
because these injustices violate their own moral principles. This
recognition motivates people to eliminate the violation through
politicized identification with the relevant ingroup (van Zomeren
et al., 2012). The relevant ingroup may be an opinion-based
group which provides a different form of identity than ethnic
or national groups (Bliuc et al., 2007), but motivates collective
action participation more strongly than other forms of group
identification (McGarty et al., 2009).
People more readily feel empathy with members of their
own group than non-members, and this difference has an
impact on behavioral intentions, such as helping (Stürmer
et al., 2006). Therefore, ideas of citizenship can increase
or decrease empathy and intergroup action intentions by
affecting both perceptions of similarity among members and
the permeability of group boundaries (for the connection
between global citizenship, empathy and intergroup helping
see Reysen and Katzarska-Miller, 2013). As we have seen, those
who perceive entry into the national ingroup in more flexible
ways and consider the nation as an inclusive category may feel
more empathy with members of ethnic minorities or immigrants
compared to those who define the national ingroup in more rigid
and exclusive ways. Therefore, we expect that different definitions
of citizenship can elicit higher or lower empathy with members
of outgroups, and mediate the connection between definitions of
citizenship and intergroup action intentions. However, empathy
becomes especially important when injustices are caused by
the actions of one’s own advantaged ingroup. It leads people
to engage in social change actions to reduce their collective
guilt (Calcagno, 2016) and to improve the moral image of their
ingroup (Täuber and van Zomeren, 2013). Consequently, in the
presence of empathy and injustice awareness, majority group
members may be motivated to engage in collective action as allies.
Therefore, definitions of citizenship may elicit intergroup action
tendencies differently in the presence of high or low empathy with
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the outgroup, thus functions as a moderator in the relationship as
well.
Putting together the results of previous research on national
identity, intergroup emotions, and collective action presented in
the introduction, we argue that the treatment of disadvantaged
ethnic minority groups as well as ethnically different immigrant
groups are dependent on ideas about the nation. People who
endorse an ethnic definition of citizenship are more likely to
feel threatened by ethnic minority and immigrant groups and
this threat would motivate engagement in pro-majority collective
action. Clearly, empathy with people whose suffering is caused
by the ingroup would be hindered by ideas about ingroup
superiority among nationalists and that the ingroup can do no
wrong. In contrast, people who endorse a civic citizenship can
have a more critical awareness of social injustices even if their
ingroup is responsible for them, and are therefore more likely
to feel empathy for minorities, which in turn motivates them for
collective action as allies. These predictions fit into the literature
on emotions and specifically on intergroup emotions suggesting
that emotions have antecedents and consequences (Iyer and
Leach, 2008).
Research Question and Hypotheses
Our research questions are whether the endorsement of
different definitions of the nation predicts pro-social and hostile
intergroup behavioral intentions differently, and whether the
connection between the definition of the nation and intergroup
behavioral intentions is mediated by empathy and threat.
Specifically, we hypothesized that the endorsement of an ethnic
definition would predict lower pro-minority and higher pro-
majority collective action and this connection would be mediated
by higher threat and lower empathy. In contrast, we hypothesized
that the endorsement of a civic definition would predict higher
pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action and this
connection would be mediated by lower fear and higher empathy.
However, both threat and empathy can stem from experiences
not directly connected to citizenship, yet affect intergroup
behavioral intentions. Therefore, these two intergroup emotions
can potentially be treated as moderators as well, thus not
mediating, just amplifying or weakening the connection between
citizenship and action intentions.
As most research related to this issue focused on ethnically
different immigrant groups, and not on historical ethnic
minorities or specifically the Roma, we did not make specific
predictions regarding differences in collective action intentions
related to these two outgroups, but generally predicted that the
pattern would be identical for the Roma and the immigrant
outgroups.
We tested these connections in two studies to establish both
the association between the study variables and their causal
connections. In Study 1, we conducted an online survey to show
the connection between different definitions of citizenship and
both pro-minority and pro-majority action, and show whether
empathy and fear mediates this connection. In Study 2, we
manipulated the concept of citizenship by making an ethnic
or a civic definition salient, and tested whether it affected pro-
minority or pro-majority collective action tendencies. We also
checked whether the connection is different in the presence of
high or low empathy and fear. Both studies were conducted
following the IRB approval of Eötvös Loránd University.
METHOD
The Context of the Current Studies
The idea of multiculturalism and tolerance has never been
adopted in Eastern Europe, and despite the cultural and
linguistic diversity of the region, most contemporary nation
states are rather homogenous ethnically and endorse ethnic
definitions of citizenship (Reijerse et al., 2012). The idea of
ethnic citizenship has been central to the current right-wing
government of Hungary too. They have held so-called national
consultations since 2011 in which they communicated their
program and political visions (Government of Hungary, 2017).
These national consultations served the purpose of direct public
legitimation for the government (see a reflection on one of the
national consultations by Bearak, 2017). The first two national
consultations are relevant for the current research as they
were concerned with defining the members of the national
ingroup and its enemies, putting forward an ethnic definition
and emphasizing the impermeability of its boundaries by for
example items such as these: “There are people who suggest that
Hungary’s new constitution should express the value of national
belongingness with Hungarians living outside the borders, while
others suggest that it is not important” or “There are people
who suggest that Hungary’s new constitution should defend our
national resources, especially the land and water.” (referring to a
ban on foreign ownership).
This social and political context creates a hostile environment
for the Roma, the largest ethnic minority group in Hungary.
Although Roma people have lived in Hungary since at least the
15th century, they continue to be treated as second class citizens
in mainstream political discourse, resulting in institutional
discrimination, social marginalization, and poverty (Feischmidt
et al., 2013; Kovarek et al., 2017). Their history in Hungary can be
characterized by swings between forced assimilation and extreme
forms of discrimination starting with their settlement in the 18th
century, culminating in the Porrajmos, the Roma Holocaust in
the Second World War (Hancock, 2004). Negative stereotypes
about the Roma include criminality and laziness, suggesting that
their rejection from the majority society is dependent on their
lack efforts for becoming accepted members of society (Kende
et al., 2017).
The rhetoric of ethnic citizenship was utilized in the anti-
immigrant propaganda that started in 2015 (Tremlett and
Messing, 2015). This propaganda included different waves of
national consultations, media campaigns with messages of threat
about illegal Muslim immigration, and a referendum against
immigration. Eventually, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant
attitudes exceeded any other form of intergroup hostility in
Hungary, including prejudice against the Roma (Simonovits
and Bernáth, 2015; Wike et al., 2016). These changes took
place despite the fact that Hungary has not been the target
of any terrorist attacks of Islamic extremists, nor does it
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have a significant or visible Muslim or non-ethnic Hungarian
immigrant population.
Study 1
Sample
Originally, we relied on a sample of 1080 participants from
an online participant pool using a multiple-step, proportionally
stratified, probabilistic sampling method resulting in a sample
demographically similar to the Hungarian population in terms
of age, gender, level of education, and type of settlement. The
recruitment was carried out by a professional public opinion
company. We did not conduct sample size calculations based on
a priori estimations of effect size, but targeted N = 1000 that is
typically used in opinion poll surveys relying on representative
samples of Hungarian society (for the accuracy of estimating
election results in Hungary using different sample sizes see Poll of
Polls, 2018). Using this sample allowed us to test our hypotheses
on an extensive and diverse sample of the Hungarian population.
Eleven participants declared that they belonged to the Roma
minority. They were removed from the analyses which left us with
N = 1069. The sample was randomly split: half of the respondents
received a questionnaire related to the Roma (n = 517), and the
other half related to Muslim immigrants (n = 552). We used the
term Muslim immigrant (“muszlim bevándorló”) throughout the
questionnaire to refer to the group of people that represent the
most recent wave of immigrants mostly from the Middle East and
Africa in order to distinguish this group from a large group of
ethnic Hungarian immigrants from neighboring countries. We
avoided the term refugee, migrant or illegal immigrant as these
terms are heavily politicized in the Hungarian context. However,
this group can include non-Muslim immigrants too, such as for
example Christians from Syria, therefore we refer to them as
immigrants in the paper. The sample consisted of 52.2% women
and 47.1% men, and the mean age was 46.8 years (SD = 15.67,
18–79). In terms of education level, 34.1% had a higher education
degree, 44.1% had secondary education, and 21.9% lower than
secondary education; 15.4% lived in the capital city, 54.3% in
another city, 29.2% in villages, and 1.1% abroad. All participants
were Hungarian nationals. No participants indicated that they
were Muslim. On a one to seven scale of self-placement from
left-wing to right-wing, the mean score was 4.23 (SD = 1.74).
Measures
Scales in the questionnaire for the Roma and immigrant
outgroups were identical, but slightly rephrased to adapt to
their different contexts where it was necessary. Additionally,
some attitude scales were presented in both questionnaires
and analyzed for the full sample, and variables not related to
outgroups were all identical. Data collected for the current study
was part of an omnibus survey. Respondents were informed
that the survey would consist of questions related to social and
political issues. Questions of citizenship were asked immediately
after the demographic questions, not preceded by any other
scales. Following the question of citizenship, we asked about
the approval or disapproval of hostile political discourse against
either the Roma or immigrants for the purpose of another study.
This may have focused respondents’ attention to the situation
of these out-groups within the political climate of the country
rather than within other (non-politicized) context that we found
favorable for the current study. These questions were followed
by the question of empathy and threat. Questions regarding
collective action were asked immediately after questions about
threat. All other scales were presented following the scales of the
current study. We present all variables and data exclusions related
to the current research question. Answers were indicated on a
7-point scale (from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely
agree) on all items, unless otherwise indicated.
For the ethnic and civic perception of citizenship, we relied
on the items derived from the scale of the International Social
Survey Programme (International Social Survey Programme,
2014) with one item indicating ethnic citizenship (“to have
Hungarian ancestry”), and one item indicating civic citizenship
(“to feel Hungarian”) following the original ISSP instruction
“Some people say that the following things are important for
being truly Hungarian. Others say they are not important. How
important do you think each of the following is. . .”. Complex
constructs such as ideas of citizenship are ideally not tested using
a single-item scale (Bergkvist, 2015). The ISSP scale may be the
most widely used measure of these two forms of citizenship, but
the scale does not yield to an acceptable two-factor model in
the Hungarian context1. Problems with the operationalization
of these two forms of citizenship is also supported by critiques
suggesting that language and religion may not be so strongly
connected to the concept of citizenship (e.g., Reijerse et al., 2013).
Therefore, we made a theoretical decision to rely on individual
items that best reflected ethnic and civic definitions in the context
of Hungary. Ancestry has been shown to be the core component
of ethnic citizenship, and “to feel Hungarian” was the strongest
component of civic citizenship in the cross-cultural comparative
study of Reeskens and Hooghe (2010). Furthermore, “to feel
Hungarian” is the most liberal definition of citizenship in the
sense that it sets no external limits to gaining entry into the
group, but solely relies on individuals’ wish to join the group.
Hence, it seemed the most suitable item for testing whether
these two approaches to citizenship predict different outcomes.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that “to feel Hungarian” may
be interpreted in different ways by respondents, as it captures
both the affective and the cognitive component of social identity.
For example, when choosing this option as an important aspect
of belonging to the national ingroup, some people may put an
emphasis on self-categorization as Hungarian, while others on
the affective commitment to the group (for a distinction see
Ellemers et al., 1999). Respect for law and political institutions
may be more central to the idea of civic citizenship, this item
appears as an expectation within the concept of ethnic citizenship
as well, shown by its high cross loading in previous studies
(Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010). Although two other items of
citizenship were included in the questionnaire (“to be born in
1Based on calculations made using the publicly available database retrieved from
http://www.issp.org, using Maximum Likelihood analysis with Promax rotation we
could not identify a two-factor solution, but found three factors with eigenvalues
about one. However, religion and feeling Hungarian created single-item scales,
while all other scales loaded onto the mixed ethnic-civic factor.
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Hungary” and “to respect Hungary’s political institutions and
laws”), they were not used in the analysis.
We measured pro-minority collective action intentions by
four items asking participants about their action intentions in
case Roma people/Muslim immigrants moved close to their
home to make the context of the questions more real. These
items were put together following the example of van Zomeren
et al. (2012). Respondents could explicitly state intentions to
do something against injustices (“I would support actions to
protect the rights of Roma people/Muslim immigrants,” “I would
stand up against the segregation of Roma people/deportation of
Muslim immigrants,” “I would sign a petition to stand up for the
rights of Roma people/Muslim immigrants,” “I would encourage
my acquaintances to participate in protests for the right of
Roma people/Muslim immigrants” Roma: α = 0.87, immigrant:
α = 0.76).
Pro-majority collective action was measured by four items
similar to the pro-minority collective action items, but adapted
to the different context [“I would support actions to protect
Hungarians from minorities,” “I would participate in a protest
for protecting the rights of Hungarians,” “I would encourage
my acquaintances to stand up for the rights of Hungarians,” “I
would not vote for a party or politician who claims to protect
the rights of Hungarians rather than the rights of minorities”
(reverse scored)]. Because of low reliability, the reversed item had
to be removed from the scale, the remaining three items had good
reliabilities (Roma: α = 0.77, immigrant: α = 0.77).
Empathy toward the minority groups was measured using a
single item asking specifically whether respondents felt empathy
toward the groups in the current political context. The item
“együttérzés” refers to emotional rather than cognitive empathy,
and is used similarly – in some cases even interchangeably –
with sympathy or compassion in everyday language. Although
cognitive empathy has been identified as more closely connected
to intergroup helping behavior while emotional empathy with
avoidance (Einolf, 2012), we opted for the use of this term because
the word “empátia” (the literal translation and technical term
for empathy in Hungarian) is less known outside academia. We
measured perceived threat based on the integrated threat theory
(Stephan and Stephan, 2000), using six items describing both
symbolic and realistic threat to tap into general fear related to the
minority groups (for example “Rome people/Muslim immigrants
pose a health threat to Hungarians,” “The cultural values of Roma
people/Muslim immigrants are in opposition with Hungarian
values” Roma: α = 0.83, immigrant: α = 0.89, based on Kteily
et al., 2015). Although we measured both symbolic and realistic
threat regarding both groups, factor analysis revealed only one
factor of threat in line with the findings from previous research
in the same intergroup context (Kende et al., 2017). Nevertheless,
we checked the results entering the two forms of threats as two
separate variables in the model that yielded to a similar pattern
as the model with one threat variable. The two forms of threat
were highly correlated in both samples (Roma r = 0.70, p < 0.001,
immigrant r = 0.83, p < 0.001). Information on the model is
available in the Supplementary Materials.
In order to compare attitudes toward the two groups, we
used the feeling thermometer in both subsamples in connection
with the two outgroups, using a 10-point scale (from 1 = very
unlikable to 10 = very likeable). We also measured intergroup
distance using two items, one about perceiving Hungarians and
the Roma/Muslim immigrants as one group in Hungary, and a
second item about perceiving Hungarians and the Roma/Muslim
immigrants as one group in the world (based on Riek et al., 2010,
the correlations of the two items for the combined samples were
Roma: r = 0.78, p < 0.001, immigrant: r = 0.74, p < 0.001).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Little MCAR test indicated that data was missing at random in
all the variables included in the analysis [Roma: χ2(36) = 34.65,
p = 0.533; immigrant: χ2(13) = 11.95, p = 0.532].
The comparison of attitudes toward the two groups showed a
stronger dislike of immigrants than Roma people based on the
scores of the feeling thermometer [Roma: M = 4.07, SD = 2.34,
immigrant: M = 3.32, SD = 2.35, t(1018) = 10.87, p < 0.001], and
a stronger perception of the Roma and Hungarians as one group
than of immigrants and Hungarians [Roma: M = 4.64, SD = 2.23,
immigrant: M = 3.82, SD = 2.77, t(1035) = 8.45, p < 0.001].
Descriptive statistics and correlations between all study
variables are shown on Table 1. Correlations between variables
suggest that in connection with the Roma outgroup the
acceptance (or reversely the rejection) of the civic definition
was associated with higher empathy, lower threat, higher pro-
minority and lower-pro-majority action intentions, while in
connection with the immigrant outgroup the rejection (or
reversely the acceptance) of the ethnic definition showed the
same pattern of connections. Empathy and threat were strongly
correlated with both types of action intentions in case of both
outgroups. Civic and ethnic definitions of citizenship showed
weak positive correlations in both samples.
Hypothesis testing
We used Structural Equation Modeling (using AMOS 22.0) to
test our hypothesis that the endorsement of an ethnic definition
would predict lower pro-minority and higher pro-majority
collective action and that this connection would be mediated
by higher fear and lower empathy, while the endorsement of
a civic definition would predict the opposite. We included
political orientation as a control variable to test whether we can
identify predictions beyond the effect of left-right orientation. We
identified the most adequate model using the model building –
model trimming technique (see Shah et al., 2005). We built
a saturated model in which ethnic and civic definitions were
allowed to predict both pro-minority and pro-majority collective
action mediated by both types of emotions. Such a saturated
model shows a perfect fit withχ2, RMSEA, and SRMR values of 0,
and a CFI value of 1. We then trimmed the non-significant paths
to create simultaneously sufficient and parsimonious models that
enable us to test the effects of both the civic and the ethnic
definition (for a visual presentation of the path with standardized
coefficients, see Figure 1). The trimmed models still showed
very good fit for both outgroups (Roma: χ2 = 13.98, p = 0.082;
df = 8; CFI = 0.993; RMSEA = 0.038; SRMR = 0.024; immigrant:
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TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations and correlations between all measured variables of Study 1.
Roma
M SD Ethnic Empathy Threat Pro-minority CA Pro-majority CA Political orientation
Civic 5.08 1.63 0.21∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.13∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.02 −0.01
Ethnic 4.53 1.64 – −0.03 0.10∗ 0.01 0.27∗∗ 0.11∗
Empathy 3.50 1.70 – −0.58∗∗ 0.64∗∗ −0.45∗∗ −0.15∗
Threat 3.95 1.24 – −0.61∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.21∗∗
Pro-minority CA 3.08 1.39 – −0.35∗∗ −0.17∗∗
Pro-majority CA 4.15 1.55 – 0.18∗∗
Political orientation (left-right) 4.12 1.81 –
Muslim immigrants
Civic 5.18 1.54 0.14∗∗ 0.11∗ −0.03 0.05 0.05 0.10∗
Ethnic 4.64 1.64 – −0.20∗∗ −0.34∗∗ −0.20∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.22∗∗
Empathy 3.18 1.72 – −0.64∗∗ 0.61∗∗ −0.47∗∗ −0.30∗∗
Threat 4.63 1.46 – −0.66∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.42∗∗
Pro-minority CA 2.79 1.35 – −0.41∗∗ −0.35∗∗
Pro-majority CA 4.49 1.52 – 0.40∗∗
Political orientation (left-right) 4.31 1.68 –
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between variables in Study 1 based on the mediation analysis with political orientation controlled in the model. Numbers represent
standardized coefficients for both groups. The first number before the slash refers to the Roma outgroup, and the second to the immigrant outgroup. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
χ2 = 12.46, p = 0.029; df = 5; CFI = 0.994; RMSEA = 0.052;
SRMR = 0.028).
To reveal whether the relationships between ethnic and civic
citizenship on the one hand, and pro-minority and pro-majority
on the other hand were mediated by threat and empathy, a series
of mediational analyses was conducted with the bootstrapping
technique suggested by Macho and Ledermann (2011), where
we requested 95% confidence intervals using 5000 resamples.
An indirect effect is considered significant if the unstandardized
95% confidence interval around the estimate does not contain 0.
Significant indirect effects are shown in Table 2.
Discussion
The weak positive correlation between ethnic and civic
definitions of citizenship underlines previous assumptions that
the two conceptualizations of citizenship are neither entirely
antagonistic nor completely independent, but those who endorse
an ethnic definition would also have expectations regarding
personal efforts to be citizens (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010).
Nevertheless, all of our hypotheses were confirmed by the data,
that is, the endorsement of an ethnic definition predicted lower
pro-minority and higher pro-majority collective action and this
connection was mediated by higher fear and lower empathy,
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TABLE 2 | Indirect effects of civic vs. ethnic identity on collective action intentions mediated by empathy and threat toward immigrants and the Roma in Study 1.
Target groups Indirect pathway B SE 95% Confidence Interval β p
Immigrants Civic def.→ Empathy→ Pro-minority CA 0.02 0.01 [0.01,0.05] 0.03 0.004
Ethnic def.→ Threat→ Pro-majority CA 0.10 0.02 [0.07,0.15] 0.11 0.001
Roma Civic def.→ Empathy→ Pro-minority CA 0.07 0.02 [0.03,0.11] 0.08 0.001
Ethnic def.→ Threat→ Pro-majority CA 0.03 0.02 [0.03,0.06] 0.03 0.046
while the endorsement of a civic definition predicted higher
pro-minority and lower pro-majority collective action and this
connection was mediated by lower fear and higher empathy. This
result is in line with previous research suggesting the importance
of the role of defining the nation in inclusive or exclusive ways
(see Minescu et al., 2008; Wagner et al., 2012), and the potential
consequences for the integration of minorities (Sides and Citrin,
2007; Hochman et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). As our
outcome variable was pro-minority and pro-majority collective
action, we were also able to show that these definitions of the
nation matter for mobilization, as they predicted intergroup
emotions differently which in turn predicted both types of
mobilizations in opposite ways.
However, simple correlations and the strength of these
connections suggested that different aspects of the definition of
the nation were important in connection with the Roma and with
immigrant outgroups. In case of the Roma, the endorsement of a
civic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup emotions
and collective action, while in the case of immigrants, the ethnic
definition was the stronger predictor. The distinction may be
explained by several factors related to the differences in the
perceptions of the Roma living in Hungary and the perception
of immigrants. Our data provided evidence that immigrants were
considered more distant from Hungarians than the Roma. This
is similar to Parker’s (2010) finding that domestic outgroups,
such as African Americans or Jews were evaluated differently
than Arab people based on symbolic patriotism, but not based
on blind patriotism. Furthermore, the basis of rejection of
immigrants is precisely their intention to gain some form of
citizenship, therefore they represent a threat particularly to those
who endorse an ethnic definition of citizenship. In contrast,
negative stereotypes related to Roma people mostly revolve
around their lack of effort for integration and of respect for
majority institutions and laws (Kende et al., 2017), which can
be interpreted as violations from the perspective of the civic
definition of citizenship.
This study provided correlational evidence from a
representative survey that ethnic and civic concepts of citizenship
predicted pro-minority and pro-majority intergroup action
intentions in opposite ways, and the connection was mediated by
relevant intergroup emotions. In order to understand whether
personal endorsement of these two concepts has a causal effect
on mobilizing people for or against minorities, we conducted
an experiment in which we manipulated concepts of citizenship
through different positive accounts of what it means to be
Hungarian. We expected that the civic as opposed to the ethnic
manipulation would predict higher pro-minority and lower pro-
majority collective action intentions. However, we expected that
this effect would be strongest in the presence of high empathy
with the minority groups and low fear from them. We therefore
tested a moderation effect of intergroup emotions rather than a
mediation effect as opposed to Study 1.
This different statistical approach was due to the different
designs of the studies and the type of manipulation that we used
in Study 2. In the survey we measured people’s pre-existing ideas
of the nation that we expected to be the basis of intergroup
emotions as previous research suggested (in connection with
threat see e.g., Coryn et al., 2004; Sniderman et al., 2004; in
connection with empathy see e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; Calcagno,
2016). However, in Study 2 we used positive accounts of the
nation to increase the salience of the ethnic and civic aspects of
citizenship, respectively, that did not contain any information
directly related to minorities. Furthermore, the manipulation was
positively framed, and therefore, we did not expect that it would
directly elicit empathy toward the groups or fear from them
as it could have been in the case of using for example identity
threatening manipulations that elicit intergroup emotions (e.g.,
Hutchison et al., 2006). However, we expected that the positive
text of the manipulation would resonate more strongly and
increase pro-minority collective action intentions if respondents
already had higher empathy toward the outgroups and lower
fear from them. In contrast, we expected that the effect of the
manipulation would be stronger in the absence of empathy and
higher fear from the outgroup. For this reason, we relied on
people’s preexisting intergroup emotions as the moderators of the
effect of ideas about citizenship.
Study 2
Design
We used an experimental design in which we manipulated
definitions of citizenship. In order to increase the personal
endorsement of either the ethnic or the civic definitions, we
created descriptions that presented Hungarian identity equally
positively, yet the civic manipulation described the nation as
an inclusive group, suggesting that inclusion was based on
individual efforts, and emphasized the shared history of Hungary
with other nations, and the ethnic manipulation suggested that
the valuable aspects of citizenship were based on ancestry, and
emphasized the uniqueness of its history (for a full description
of the text and the pictures of the manipulation see the
Supplementary Materials).
Sample
Respondents were recruited from a university class where
students participate in research for credit (N = 436). The sample
consisted of BA and MA students from all faculties of Eötvös
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Loránd University. Seven people failed the first attention check
question which simply asked about the main topic of the text.
The second attention check was related to the core aspects of the
manipulation, and 23 respondents in the ethnic and 93 in the civic
condition chose the wrong option, that is, they either indicated
that they had not remembered the answer or chose the option
that was valid for the opposite condition. These respondents were
removed from the analysis, resulting in an overall sample size of
N = 320 (civic n = 108; ethnic n = 181).
Power analysis was conducted based on the correlations from
Study 1 that fell between 0.2 and 0.4 regarding the definitions
of citizenship and action intentions. Relying on the weaker
connection for a more conservative estimation of sample size,
G∗Power analysis requested N = 328 for 95% power to detect an
effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.4 (Faul et al., 2009). Our sample was
therefore sufficient to test the expected connection even after the
removal of participants who failed the attention check.
The original sample consisted of 77.1% women and 22.5%
men, the reduced sample had 78.2% women and 21.5% men. The
mean age of participants was 20.97 years (SD = 2.03) in the full
sample, and M = 21.6 years (SD = 1.31) in the reduced sample.
Self-placement from left-wing to right-wing had a mean score
was 4.10 (SD = 1.26) in the full sample, and M = 4.02 (SD = 2.12)
in the reduced sample.
Procedure
Using the Qualtrics platform, participants were randomly
assigned to either the civic or the ethnic condition, and were
informed that the questionnaire consisted of two independent
parts: the first one was concerned with the topic of pride, and the
second one with intergroup relations. Presenting the purpose of
the questionnaire as a study on pride was supposed to increase
the positive endorsement of the definition of the nation and
mask the real purpose of the questionnaire about the connection
between citizenship concepts and intergroup action intentions.
Participants were presented with the text of the manipulation
that was allegedly from an actor who answered an open question
of a magazine about Hungary. The text was accompanied by
portraits of four famous Hungarian people (two sportspeople, a
scientist, and a singer). We used visual images to increase the
priming effect as shown by for example Abraham and Appiah
(2006). In the civic condition one of the sportspeople and the
singer were foreign-born and gained Hungarian citizenship later
in their lives, while the scientist was of Roma origin. In the ethnic
condition, all pictures depicted ethnic Hungarians. One picture
of an ethnic Hungarian sportsperson was identical in the two
conditions.
After the presentation of the text, two attention check
questions were asked to establish whether participants paid
attention to the text at all, and to the core message of the
text, and one question whether they agreed with the message
of the text. Attention check questions were introduced so
that participants who did not read the text carefully can be
removed from the analysis, and agreement was measured in
order to assess whether the text was equally acceptable in the
two conditions, and relatedly, to identify a potential backfire
effect in either of the conditions. Participants then answered the
questions about citizenship that served as a manipulation check
testing the effectiveness of the manipulation. They were then
forwarded to the “next” questionnaire about intergroup relations
where questions about intergroup emotions and collective action
intentions related to Roma people and immigrants were asked.
Scales related to the Roma and immigrants were presented in a
randomized order.
Measures
We checked the manipulation using the same single items of
ethnic and civic citizenship as in Study 1 from the International
Social Survey Programme (2014). Answers were indicated on a 7-
point scale (from 1 = completely disagree to 7 = completely agree)
on all items.
Intergroup empathy and fear were tested using single
items, asking the extent to which respondents felt the listed
emotions when they were thinking about the situation of Roma
people/Muslim immigrants. Other emotions were listed as fillers
in the scale.
Pro-minority and pro-majority collective action intentions
were measured by the same items related to both minorities from
Study 1. Pro-minority collective action with four items (Roma:
α = 0.89, immigrant: α = 0.92), and pro-majority collective action
with 3, however, the reversed item of the scale needed to be
removed because of low reliability. The remaining two items were
correlated more strongly (Roma: r = 0.57, p < 0.001; immigrant:
r = 0.55, p < 0.001).
Results
Manipulation checks
The texts of the manipulation were generally accepted by the
respondents, and there were no differences in the level of
agreement with the text in the two conditions. We also checked
whether agreement with the manipulation was different when
testing it on the sample that included people who failed the
attention check questions and without them, and found no
differences in agreement either in the full sample [Ethnic:
M = 5.39, SD = 1.40, Civic: M = 5.61, SD = 1.25, t(434) = −1.73,
p = 0.084], or in the reduced sample [Ethnic: M = 5.41, SD = 1.40,
Civic: M = 5.63, SD = 1.25, t(287) =−1.31, p = 0.190]. This similar
level of agreement suggests that the failed attention check was not
likely the result of reactance or the effect of established attitudes,
but rather of a lack of attention.
In terms of the direct effect of the manipulation on the concept
of citizenship, following the ethnic manipulation, participants
agreed more with the idea that citizenship was primarily based
on ancestry, that is, with the core idea of ethnic citizenship than
following the civic manipulation [Ethnic: M = 4.79, SD = 1.54,
Civic: M = 4.25, SD = 1.62, t(287) = 2.84, p = 0.005]. However,
we found no differences in the agreement with the statement that
citizenship was a matter of feeling Hungarian [Ethnic: M = 6.11,
SD = 1.17, Civic: M = 6.05, SD = 1.16, t(287) = 0.45, p = 0.652].
This result suggests that the manipulation was only effective in
changing the idea of citizenship in the ethnic dimension and
not in the civic dimension. In sum, despite identifying some
problems with the manipulation check questions that can suggest
both a superficial engagement in the manipulation and the effect
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TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations in the two conditions and in total in
Study 2.
Ethnic Civic Total
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Empathy Roma 3.44 (1.62) 3.83 (1.67) 3.59 (1.64)
Empathy immigrant 3.96 (1.66) 4.22 (1.64) 4.06 (1.65)
Fear Roma 4.39 (1.72) 4.05 (2.00) 4.26 (1.83)
Fear immigrant 3.94 (1.80) 3.80 (1.93) 3.89 (1.85)
Pro-Roma action 2.38 (1.27) 2.87 (1.64) 2.56 (1.44)
Pro-immigrant action 2.31 (1.38) 2.71 (1.63) 2.46 (1.49)
Pro-majority action 3.81 (1.68) 3.62 (1.55) 3.74 (1.63)
of preexisting attitudes, we can conclude that the texts were
positively rated and were acceptable in both conditions (shown
by the level of agreement), and the manipulation was effective
to the extent that it created differences in accepting the ethnic
citizenship idea.
Descriptive statistics
Means and standard deviations in the two conditions are
presented in Table 3. Both empathy and fear scores were around
the midpoint in connection with both minority groups. However,
in contrast to recent public opinion polls that indicated higher
hostility toward immigrants than toward Roma (see Wike et al.,
2016), we found that empathy with the Roma was lower than
with immigrants, while fear from the Roma was higher. These
differences were confirmed by paired-sample t-tests [Empathy:
t(288) = 5.02, p < 0.001, CI: 0.28, 0.65; Fear: t(288) = −3.21,
p = 0.001, CI: −0.60, −0.14]. Action intentions in favor of both
minority groups were rather low, and lower than pro-majority
action intentions that were close to the midpoint.
Hypothesis testing
Respondents in the civic condition showed significantly higher
intentions for pro-minority collective action both in connection
with the Roma [Ethnic: M = 2.37, SD = 1.27, Civic: M = 2.84,
SD = 1.67, t(184) = −2.69, p = 0.008, Levene’s test indicated
unequal variances, F = 14.65, p < 0.001, so degrees of freedom
were adjusted from 287 to 184] and in connection with
immigrants [Ethnic: M = 2.31, SD = 1.38, Civic: M = 2.71,
SD = 1.63, t(196.5) = −2.10, p = 0.037, Levene’s test indicated
unequal variances, F = 6.09, p < 0.001, so degrees of freedom
were adjusted from 287 to 196.5]. However, no differences were
found in the intentions for pro-majority action [Ethnic: M = 3.81,
SD = 1.68, Civic: M = 3.62, SD = 1.55, t(287) = 0.94, p = 0.349].
In order to test whether empathy and fear moderated the effect
of priming a civic versus an ethnic definition on pro-minority and
pro-majority collective action intentions, we conducted a series
of general linear regression analyses with an interaction term.
Firstly, we ran an analysis with pro-minority collective action
intentions as the outcome variable, and entered the interaction
of the condition and empathy in the model, then repeated the
analysis with the interaction of condition and fear. Secondly, we
ran the analyses with pro-majority collective action intentions
as the outcome variable, and the same interactions. We found
a main effect for empathy on pro-minority collective action
intentions [Roma: F(1,286) = 44.87, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.49;
immigrant: F(1,289) = 23.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.36] and fear
in opposite directions [Roma: F(1,289) = 11.43, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.20; immigrant: F(1,289) = 16.56, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.26],
suggesting that participants had higher pro-minority collective
action intentions in the presence of higher empathy and lower
fear. We also identified a significant interaction effect of empathy
on pro-Roma collective actions [F(3,285) = 6.72, p = 0.010,
η2p = 0.02], and a marginal effect on pro-immigrant collective
action intentions [F(3,285) = 3.15, p = 0.077, η2p = 0.01].
Furthermore, fear also moderated the effect of civic vs. ethnic
priming on pro-minority collective action intentions for both
groups [Roma: F(3,285) = 4.04, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.01; immigrant:
F(3,285) = 5.42, p = 0.021, η2p = 0.02]. Simple slope analysis with
centered empathy and fear variables revealed that respondents
in the civic condition indicated higher pro-minority collective
action intentions in the presence of high empathy and low
fear, that is, pairwise comparisons showed that intentions for
pro-minority collective action intentions were only significantly
higher in the civic condition compared to the ethnic condition
when empathy was high [at +1SD Roma: F(1,285) = 10.79,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.04, immigrant: F(1,285) = 6.77, p = 0.013,
η2p = 0.02], and fear was average or low [at −1SD Roma:
F(1,285) = 9.98, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.03, immigrant: F(1,285) = 10.14,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.03]. Simple slopes with error bars for pro-
minority collective action intentions with empathy and fear as
moderators are presented on Figure 2.
Pro-majority collective action intentions were not directly
affected by the manipulations, but we still tested whether these
intentions were affected differently in the presence of high or
low empathy with either minority groups, and high or low fear
of either groups. We found a main effect of empathy on pro-
majority collective action [Roma: F(1,286) = 6.09, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.12; immigrant: F(1,289) = 5.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.11], that
is, low empathy predicted higher pro-majority collective action
intentions. Similarly, fear had a main effect on these intentions
[Roma: F(1,289) = 4.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.09; immigrant:
F(1,289) = 15.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25], suggesting that
higher fear predicted higher intentions of pro-majority collective
action intentions. However, no interaction effect was found with
either empathy [Roma: F(3,286) = 0.75, p = 0.388, η2p < 0.01;
immigrant: F(3,286) = 0.92, p = 0.761, η2p < 0.01] or fear [Roma:
F(3,286) = 0.48, p = 0.488, η2p < 0.01; immigrant: F(3,286) = 0.54,
p = 0.462, η2p < 0.01]. Therefore, the manipulation did not affect
those high or low in empathy, or high or low in fear differently.
Discussion
Our second study was conducted with the intention to reveal
whether different definitions of the nation can have a mobilizing
effect on people to become allies of minority groups, or
mobilize to protect the ethnic majority group. Our results
only partially confirmed this hypothesis, as manipulation check
questions suggested that only the ethnic definition was affected
by the manipulation and the different definitions of the nation
influenced pro-minority action intentions, but did not affect
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FIGURE 2 | Simple slopes for pro-minority (Roma and immigrant) collective action intentions with empathy and fear as moderators with error bars.
intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action. This
is in fact good news for civil rights movements, as even a
simple manipulation of presenting the nation in inclusive and
civic terms could decrease the idea of ethnic citizenship and
increase intentions to participate in collective action on behalf of
minorities compared to presenting the nation in exclusive and
ethnic terms. In contrast, the findings could be bad news for
right-wing nationalist mobilization, as the manipulation was not
effective in increasing collective action intentions on behalf of the
majority ethnic group. However, this lack of effect also suggests
that a more impactful manipulation would be needed to decrease
such mobilization intentions.
Overall, our results partially confirmed the causal connection
between ideas of citizenship and pro-minority collective action
intentions, and clearly indicated that the effect is particularly
strong in the presence of empathy and in the absence of
fear. These findings reinforce previous understandings of the
importance of empathy in ally collective action (see e.g., Thomas
et al., 2009), and supplement them by highlighting that fear is
not only relevant in intergroup hostility (e.g., Coryn et al., 2004;
Sniderman et al., 2004), but its absence is also a precondition
for ally collective action intentions. These results indicate that
the ethnic definition of citizenship can, to some extent, be
manipulated relatively easily, and such an effective manipulation
can lead to change in collective action intentions. However,
these results also show that interventions that simply make
a positive civic rather than a positive ethnic national identity
salient can primarily influence people with preexisting empathy
with and lack of fear of minority groups. The importance of
preexisting attitudes was also highlighted in other studies in
which political orientation (Hameiri et al., 2016) and right-wing
authoritarianism (Dhont and Van Hiel, 2011) determined how
efficient the intervention was in increasing support of intergroup
reconciliation and decreasing prejudice. In fact, taking relevant
moderators into account seems essential for reaching the full
potential of interventions (Walton, 2014).
The lack of effect on pro-majority collective action reveals the
limits of such a simple, positive manipulation, and indicates that a
more complex manipulation may be needed to influence people’s
intentions to join nationalist movements in real life settings.
An assessment of positive LGBTQA identity training warns us
that even if such an intervention seems efficient in the lab, the
effect might not be maintained in the long run as a result of
broader, non-supportive societal norms (Riggle et al., 2014). As
norms and political rhetoric may have a more substantial impact
on the contents of national identities, future investigation on
the effects of civic versus ethnic identity manipulation should
consider both a stronger manipulation and evaluate its long-term
effects.
General Discussion
With the help of a survey and an experiment, we set out to
understand one of the most urgent social issues of Europe and
specifically of Hungary, the behavior intentions of members of
the majority group in relation to a historical ethnic minority
group – the Roma – and immigrants. In Study 1 we identified
that civic definition predicted higher pro-minority collective
action intentions with regards to the Roma outgroup, and the
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prediction was mediated by higher empathy and lower threat.
In contrast, the ethnic definition of citizenship directly predicted
pro-majority collective action intentions, and indirectly predicted
both pro-minority and pro-majority action intentions mediated
only by threat (in opposite ways, respectively). The same study
revealed an almost identical model in connection with the
immigrant outgroup, but in this case, the ethnic definition
was a stronger predictor of both types of actions, mediated by
empathy and threat in opposite ways, but directly predicting
pro-majority collective action only. For the immigrant outgroup,
the civic definition of citizenship was only a weak indirect
predictor of actions through empathy. In Study 2 we tested
whether a positively framed manipulation making the ethnic or
the civic definition salient can have an effect on action intentions,
and found that the civic definition compared to the ethnic
one increased respondents’ intention to engage in pro-minority
action. The effect was strongest in the presence of higher empathy
and lower threat for both outgroups. These two studies provide
evidence to the connection between definitions of citizenship
and politically antagonistic collective action intentions, and
show that empathy and fear play a role in this connection. In
Study 1 we found the mediating effect of these two emotions
suggesting that a civic definition can predict higher empathy
and lower fear that in turn predicts action intentions, and the
ethnic definition can predict lower empathy and higher fear
that in turn also predicts action intentions. In Study 2 we did
not expect that an increased salience of these two definitions
would predict higher or lower fear and empathy because the
manipulation did not emphasize majority–minority relations
directly, but expected and found that the manipulation would
be more successful in the presence of intergroup emotions
that correspond with the collective action intentions that we
measured in our study. While the role of intergroup emotions
was conceptualized differently in the two studies, both studies
indicated that the connection between definitions of citizenship
and collective action intentions is strengthened by empathy and
fear.
Previous research on collective action pointed out the
importance of group identification (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and
intergroup emotions (Thomas et al., 2009), however, definitions
of citizenship had not been directly connected to collective
action intentions. Bringing together these two lines of research
is important both on a theoretical and on a practical level.
The theoretical contribution of our research is that we have
shown that civic vs. ethnic citizenship ideas are not only
important in shaping intergroup attitudes as previous research
suggested (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2015; Mepham and
Verkuyten, 2017), but also relevant for intentions to engage
in action on behalf of minorities, and to join nationalist, pro-
majority movements. These findings bridge the gap between
research on citizenship and research on collective action.
We have also shown that collective action intentions among
advantaged group members with antagonistic political goals
can be understood along the same psychological constructs.
Furthermore, the similarity of the pattern for both Roma and
immigrant outgroups suggests that definitions of citizenship
generally affect the treatment of disadvantaged minority groups.
Nevertheless, the differences in the strength of the connection
indicate that immigrants and historic ethnic minorities are in
a different position when it comes to inclusion in the majority
ingroup. Ethnic citizenship was more relevant in connection with
immigrants, and civic citizenship for the Roma. We assume that
this difference has to do with the larger psychological distance
with immigrants than with Roma people, and with differences in
negative stereotypes connected to the groups.
The practical implications of our research have to do with the
nationalist public discourse that is at the core of current right-
wing populism (see Mudde, 2004). We have shown that political
rhetoric about ethnic definitions of citizenship is associated with
nationalist social movements, but it has also highlighted that
even with a relatively simple manipulation, civic citizenship can
be made salient with consequences for pro-minority collective
action. Therefore, our research points out that it could be
possible to design effective interventions and show their main
direction.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our research provided both correlational and experimental
evidence for the connection between definitions of citizenship
and collective action intentions in intergroup contexts.
Nevertheless, there are some limitations to these findings.
Reflecting on previous debates about the conceptualization of
ethnic and civic citizenship (see Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010),
and the problems with its operationalization for the Hungarian
context, we relied on single-item scales for these constructs.
Despite the limitations of single-item measures, they showed
good construct validity by predicting the outcome variables in
theoretically meaningful ways.
Another caveat is that threat and fear were measured
differently in the two studies for solely practical reasons: we
used an omnibus survey in Study 1 that already included a
measure of threat. However, this measure would have been
too long in Study 2 where dependent variables were related to
two different outgroups. Such a repetition would have risked
respondent fatigue and unreliable responses. Therefore, we opted
for shortening those scales that were repeated for both groups
in Study 2. As previous research described the intergroup
consequences of threat and fear similarly (e.g., Cottrell and
Neuberg, 2005), and our research also yielded similar patterns
in the two studies, we believe the different operationalization of
fear and threat caused no problems for the interpretation of our
findings.
We need to interpret the established causal connection
between citizenship manipulations and pro-minority collective
action intentions with some caution. In Study 1 we created
a path model with intergroup emotions as mediators in the
connection between the concept of citizenship and action
intentions, however, this order of variables does not reflect a
causal connection. Indeed, the opposite order of prediction is
equally feasible as suggested by Becker et al. (2011) in connection
with protest participation and the related emotion of anger.
Another caveat of our research in terms of establishing causality
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was the relatively high and uneven number of failed attention
check questions in Study 2. Removal of participants weakened
the internal validity of the randomized experiment, as we
cannot rule out that those who failed the attention check
answered based on their pre-existing attitudes. Furthermore, we
used a positively framed manipulation that had a measurable
effect only on the ethnic definition of citizenship while it was
unable to change the level of the civic definition, suggesting
that neither the ethnic framing could decrease the acceptance
of the civic definition or the civic definition could increase
it. This warns us about the limits of our manipulation of
citizenship.
Our first study relied on a large sample that was
demographically similar to the Hungarian population, while
we used a student pool for our second, experimental study.
The relative homogeneity of the sample in Study 2 allowed
us to have more control over the effect of the manipulation,
but the generalizability of the findings is limited by at least
two characteristics of this sample. Firstly, the group consisted
of university students, that is young people with higher than
average education. Secondly, over 70% of respondents were
women. The use of a student sample has well-known limitations
(see Sears, 1986), for example their high level of education,
and the normative context of the university can create social
desirability bias as respondents attempt to appear more open
minded and tolerant (An, 2014). This bias may have contributed
to the lack of effect on pro-majority collective action intentions
that may be seen as non-normative in a university context and
especially non-normative among women in comparison with
pro-minority collective action. White supremacy movements are
often militaristic and represent a masculine culture, and have
a disproportionally high male followership (see e.g., Hopkins,
2016; Miller-Idriss, 2017).
Finally, we did not include a control condition in Study 2. We
therefore cannot establish whether differences were the result of
increasing pro-minority collective action intentions in the civic
manipulation or of decreasing it in the ethnic manipulation, or
a little bit of both. Understanding which manipulation had the
effect would be important for designing interventions. Future
studies should therefore extend the design by including a control
condition.
Despite these caveats, we provided the first evidence for
the direct connection between definitions of citizenship and
collective action intentions among ethnic majority group
members, and presented the affective processes that contribute to
this relationship. We showed this connection with two different
outgroups, suggesting general validity while also presenting
sources of differences in different intergroup contexts. Finally,
our research pointed out that it makes sense to look at the
distinct psychological mechanisms of collective action based on
intergroup solidarity and nationalist movements simultaneously,
as they are both responses to the same political context of growing
right-wing nationalism and populism.
The research was complex in the sense that it included two
different forms of collective action intentions, two different
intergroup contexts, and analyzed two distinct emotional
processes. However, this complexity was necessary to explain
the common political and psychological roots of politically
antagonistic social movements in Europe that our research
set out to investigate. Our research has shown the scope and
potential of interventions in bringing about social change, and
also pointed out the limits of such interventions. Future research
should therefore test more effective methods of intervention.
In conclusion, we found that discourse about the nation is of
vital importance for intergroup relations and for the future of
Europe.
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